Showing posts with label Catalunya. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Catalunya. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 18, 2014

Guide to the 2014 Catalan Independence Referendum

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A mural in Granollers (Vallès Oriental) in Catalonia supporting the independence referendum and the yes vote. From murals9n.blogspot.com.es
This was an article written for One-Europe and posted in the week preceding the Catalan Independence Referendum on the 9th of November. It is meant as a brief description of the history, current situation, key players, and prospects for Catalonia, Spain, and Europe.

On the 9th of November 2014 the 7.2 million inhabitants of Catalonia, currently one of the 17 Autonomous Regions of Spain, will vote on independence from Spain in a move labeled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court and denounced as illegal by the Spanish government. The referendum, referred to colloquially as 9N, has gone through many changes and negotiations over the past few months – some of which are even on-going in the last week before the polls open.

The principal players in these negotiations are:
  • Catalan Regional President Artur Mas from the center-right and moderately nationalist party CiU 
  • Oriol Junqueras, leader of the left-wing and strongly nationalist ERC which forms the parliamentary support for Mas’ independence coalition  
  • Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy from the right-wing PP 
  • The Spanish Constitutional Court 
As well as a host of Catalan grass-roots movements, organizations and NGOs campaigning in favor of independence.
In the periphery of the debate stand the many stateless nations, minority nationalist and separatist movements in the EU, principally represented by the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Other states facing minority movements such as the UK (Scotland and Wales), France (Brittany, Corsica, Savoy, and others), Italy (Veneto, Sardinia, and others) and several other countries are also following the Catalan referendum debate closely.

A yes vote could have enormous consequences not only for Catalonia, but for Spain and the EU as well. Catalonia represents around 20% of the Spanish economic output and their secession would have disastrous results for an already crisis-ridden Spain, perhaps even leading to a statewide bankruptcy.

The immediate lead-up to the referendum ostensibly started as early as 2010, when the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the newly formulated Catalan Statute unconstitutional. The Statute, approved by both a popular Catalan vote and by a large majority in the Catalan parliament, was essentially a bill of rights that would have increased Catalan autonomy and given it the definition of a nation, one of the Constitutional Court’s foremost points of critique. In 2012, large-scale pro-independence rallies gathered upwards of 2 million Catalans in the regional capital of Barcelona, an act repeated by 1.5 million demonstrators on the Catalan National Day of September 11th 2014. This led to elections, where Artur Mas (CiU) emerged as the victor with an electoral campaign emphasizing independence for Catalonia. In December 2013, a broad coalition of pro-independence parties (El Pacte Nacional pel Dret a Decidir) in the Catalan parliament agreed upon both the date of November 9th 2014 and the questions to be posed to the Catalan voters:

1) “Do you want Catalonia to become a state?” (“Vol que Catalunya esdevingui un estat?)   2) “In case of an affirmative response [to the above], do you want this state to be independent?” (En cas afirmatiu, vol que aquest estat sigui independent?”)   

This September, as supporters of Catalan independence flooded the streets of Barcelona, Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy asserted the illegality of the referendum, and brought it to the Constitutional Court. After a preliminary veto from the Court and the strong statements against it by the Spanish government, it seemed at first that President Mas would cancel the referendum. Following massive internal protest in Mas’ independence coalition from ERC , the Catalan Greens and the pro-independence, Marxist party CUP, Mas clarified that the referendum will indeed take place, but labeled it an ‘alternative consultation’. This put into question the political weight and legitimacy of the referendum, but still allows for the possibility that a ‘yes’ might lead to the Catalan parliament declaring independence.

So where do the Catalans stand now, one week before the scheduled referendum?

Over 35.000 volunteers have signed up to aid in the referendum, and more than 900 municipal governments in Catalonia have offered their public support, with only six refusing to cooperate. The regional government will supply materials, urns, and all of the 6.430 ballot boxes will be located in governmental buildings or public schools. Several poll-sites have been opened for Catalans living abroad in London, Berlin, Copenhagen and other places, and the eligibility to vote has not been changed. The most recent polls show that more than 80% of Catalans support the vote, with around 56% supporting outright independence

Technically then, the new ‘alternative’ referendum is almost identical to what was initially proposed. The political value of a yes has been heavily diluted, however, to the chagrin of ERC chairman Oriol Junqueras. His party has openly criticized Mas’ leadership and attempts at political compromise with the Madrid government, culminating in Junqueras’ recent statement that “independence is not negotiated; it is proclaimed (…) The pact is over. ” In recent polls, ERC seems to have greatly increased their support, and would likely topple Mas’ government, should elections follow the referendum.

Parallel to these internal Catalan tensions are the continuing claims from Madrid that the referendum is illegal and unconstitutional. The Spanish government has not yet specified the consequences for Catalonia if the referendum is held, but Prime Rajoy has menacingly assured that “the government has all necessary measures ready in case anyone tries to hold an illegal referendum. ” The options of charging President Mas with high treason and the suspension of the regional autonomy of Catalonia have been suggested, both of which would be unprecedented and extremely serious measures. Furthermore, thousands of Spanish Civil Guard police officers have been readied in case the government decides to send them into Catalonia to prevent the referendum. It is unknown how Catalonia’s own police force, the Mossos d’Esquadra, would react to such an intervention but ERC’s Junqueras has called for nation-wide civil disobedience if the referendum is prevented from taking place.

With only hours left until the ballot-boxes open it is still uncertain how the Catalan independence referendum will proceed, as are the political consequences of a yes vote. More certain are the deep rifts that have formed between the Spanish and Catalan governments, and the high stakes facing the citizens of Catalonia seeking a democratic vote this Sunday.
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How not to deal with separatist movements: The Catalan Example.

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Stateless nations in Europe according to eurominority.eu. Catalonia is in the northeast of Spain.
An article I recently wrote for the online media platform One-Europe. Reprinted here on my personal blog.

Following the recent unexpected shift in momentum for the independence movements in Europe, particularly those of Scotland and Catalonia, EU policy makers in several states have too had to ask themselves one important question:  How do we reach a mutually beneficial, satisfactory, and above all peaceful solution to the issue of 'separatist' movements? 

For a prime example of how policy makers should not act in the sensitive matter of separatism we can look south to the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. The confrontational stance exhibited by Rajoy and the Spanish government towards the Catalonian region has helped to radicalize the Spanish political spectrum, thus creating serious democratic problems and heightened antagonism between the political actors at the regional level (Catalan) and the national level. The continued unequivocal refusal by Rajoy to allow a referendum on independence for Catalonia despite the wishes of several million Catalonian inhabitants presents him with a democratic problem, one which he has not handled well. His rigid legalism and lack of willingness to negotiate with separatists has effectively shut down dialogue between the government in Madrid and their regional counterpart in Barcelona, making Catalan frustrations rise further. 

Although dominant at a regional level, the lack of separatist representation in national parliaments around Europe hinders their recognition as legitimate political movements and democratically representative actors. In the UK parliament for example, the regionally dominating Scottish National Party (SNP) currently holds no seats in the House of Lords and only 6 out of 650 seats in the House of Commons. In Spain, the second largest and most ardently separatist party, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), holds 3 out of 350 seats, with the less radical CiU holding 16 in both the Senate and the Congress of Deputies. However, the vitality and democratic legitimacy of these parties can hardly be questioned. They dominate regional elections and in the case of Catalonia they manage to arrange pro-independence rallies of almost a third of their regions’ populations. Despite their lack of institutional power at a national level, they are a democratic force to be reckoned with – and should be recognized as a valuable partner in dialogue. 

When I spoke to ERC politicians in 2011, before the mass demonstrations in Barcelona, they correctly foresaw the renewed rise of the Catalan independence movement stating that issues of independence tended to fall in the background when the government did not apply pressure on Catalonia. Whenever the central Spanish government acts in a confrontational manner, support for separatism surges. If they did nothing at all, activist Carles de Rosselló argued, “We’d only be four separatists in Catalonia in 20 years time”. 

After the onset of the economic crisis the possibility for tensions between relatively well-off Catalonia and the rest of Spain has increased. Instead of calling for dialogue and understanding the PP government launched a political offensive against the integrated school system of Catalonia where teaching in Catalan is compulsory in public primary schools (though not private schools). Now the Catalan government must offer public education in Spanish to any student demanding it. This has effectively divided the education system into Spanish-language and Catalan-language schools and further causing tensions in a region that is already ripe with conflicting ethnic and linguistic identifications. “[They’re] (sic) creating ghettos”, Pau Vinyes from the ERC told me. “One school here chooses Catalan, another one Castilian. It’s going to be completely ghettoized”. A recent article in the Catalan newspaper La Vanguardia revealed that only four families out of a population of more than 7 million had demanded public schooling in Spanish, making this issue a highly symbolic venture for the Madrid Government rather than an expression of actual need on behalf of Catalonia’s citizens. 

The Catalans have taken to the streets to show their frustration time and time again, most recently during the National Holiday “la Diada” on the 11th of September this year. In 2012, a pro-independence rally in the regional capital of Barcelona numbered upwards of two million people according to the BBC, such acts cement the mass appeal of separatism in Catalonia. Compared to Catalonia the Scots seem almost apathetic. By allowing a referendum on independence to be carried out the 18th of September, David Cameron’s government has kept the debate civil and effectively lowered the tempers of the Scots, preventing the type of protests seen in Catalonia. 

After the Spanish transition to democracy following Dictator Franco’s death in 1976 many Catalan political actors expected a move towards a federal state – a move that for many reasons failed to happen causing many Catalans to feel robbed of autonomy. The ERC activists I spoke with had all favored federalist solutions in the past but now feel continually betrayed by the central government’s lack of dialogue and unwillingness to comprise in Catalan issues. As Alfred Bosch, MP for ERC has stated: “The federalist cause is very difficult for the federalists, because no-one wants to federalize with them anymore”. 

This is perhaps most exemplified by the Madrid government’s outright refusal to accept the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2006, a document both written by democratically elected representatives and approved by a popular Catalan vote. 

By denying dialogue, and referendums the Spanish government are neglecting the frustrations felt by millions of Catalans and Rajoy is contributing to tensions and animosity in both Catalonia and Spain as a whole. Rather than uniting the population that voted him into office, Rajoy has shown himself to aggravate tensions between the Catalan regional government and the separatist Catalans on one side, and his own government and the people of Spain on the other. 

Since federalist alternatives are no longer an option, and as the Spanish government staunchly refuses all dialogue and negotiation with the Catalan government, many Catalans see only one option: Take to the streets and (re) claim their autonomy and independence. 

Such an outcome is more radical, less democratic and more prone to creating ethnic fault lines and tensions in both Spain and Catalonia than if the Spanish government had swallowed their pride, sat down to negotiate and recognized the mass popular wish for autonomy in the region of Catalonia. 

EU policy-makers faced with separatist issues should take note.
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Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Visca la Sardana? Catalan Folk Dancing as Failed Rituals

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A sardana perfomance in Plaça Catedral, Barcelona.
Author's photo
As you may or may not know, I'm currently doing fieldwork on Catalan national identity and separatist politics in Barcelona. In this vein, I did a short, non-empirical analysis of the traditional Catalan folk dance known as Sardana. Treat is as an analysis of ritual and one of those comparisons between cultures, we Anthropologists are often so fond of. Here I juxtapose Javanese burial rituals and European folk dancing in modernity. It was quite well-received by the "natives" I showed it to, although they didn't agree with my admittedly stretched conclusion. Here's the original text for your pleasure.

Introduction
In this paper, I attempt a small critical discussion of the traditional folk dance of Catalonia, the sardana. I trace the sardana historically, arguing that it was part of a process of invention of tradition in the 19th century. I further attempt to analyze the sardana as a so-called “failed ritual” that no longer inspires the national unity it once did. Here I use Geertz’ Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese example (1957) as the theoretical foundation for my analysis.
Methodology
This paper is mainly theoretical. I have been to two performances of Sardana at the Plaça de la Catedral in Barcelona, seen perhaps 4 more online, such as youtube, and I’ve sporadically talked to young catalans about the dance. As such, my empirical data is very limited and I rely mainly on texts to further my argument that the sardana could be considered a ”failed ritual”. A further empirical study would be a very interesting addition to this text.
Case in point: the Sardana
The sardana is a popular, traditional circle-dance in Catalonia, and is considered the unofficial national dance of the Catalan nation (Brandes 1990:25, Martí i Pérez 1994:39).
A sardana perfomance in Plaça Catedral, Barcelona.
Author's photo
The sardana is based on standardized dances and steps. It’s always accompanied by a “cobla”, a band of 11 persons and 12 instruments, the flautist also playing a small snare drum (Martí i Perez 1994:39). Sardana as a dance originated in a small area in the north of Catalonia from the rural contrapàs and sardana curta (Martí i Perez 1994:40), extending its popularity to the rest of Catalonia only in the last half of the 19th century (Ibid., Brandes 1990). During this period, there was a surge of Catalan nationalism and the sardana was transformed from being regarded as one of many rural, regional dances to the national dance of Catalonia, being a symbol of ethnicity (Martín i Perez 1994:41). The perceived foreign elements of the sardana, such as melodies imported from French and Italian operas, polka or pasodoble were purged from the dance to make it more “pure” and Catalan (Ibid.). The rapid spread of sardana through Catalonia in the 19th century was tied to nation-building actors, using sardana as a tool to solidify and strengthen Catalan nationalism:
“The main human agents of this expansion were the politically active circles, which later also founded the strongly nationalistic sardanes associations. Each and every village in Catalonia, so it was said, should have a song association, a library or a sardanes association and, when possible, all three” (Ibid.:42).
The dance had the interesting distinction of not being forbidden during the francoist dictatorship of Spain like other manifestations of Catalan culture such as the Catalan language and flags. Martí i Perez writes that by the dictatorship, sardana was considered a folkloric dance and a harmless tradition that did not cement the values of Catalan nationalism (Ibid.).
However, after the transition to democracy beginning with Franco’s death in 1975, the sardana was adopted as a potent national symbol for Catalans. It’s officially sanctioned by the Generalitat de Catalunya with 2 national cobles and dancing groups being maintained through government funding (Ibid.). The sardana today is a highly institutionalized dance with many organizations, although popularity and membership is rapidly dwindling among young Catalans in the face of more modern forms of dance such as hip-hop and pop music (Brandes 1990).
Ritual practice
Danish anthropologist Inger Sjørslev writes that ritual and performance transform persons and space (Sjørslev 2010:4), as well as performance can raise awareness to possible futures and transcend current time and place (Ibid.:13-14). Desfor Edles points out that popular (or folkloric) cultural elements and performances, such as the sardana, help to ritualize and thereby affirm national unity and cohesion in the building of Catalan identity (Desfor Edles 1999:321). This is not to be understood in a solely instrumentalist way; the process of affirming identity thr ough rituals and creating solidarity in performance when consensus is lacking can also be unconscious or emotive (Ibid.). The solidarity-generating perspectives of the politicized performance in my view supports the transcendental aspects of the ritual described by Sjørslev and mentioned by Desfor Edles (Ibid.). As such, I argue that there is a distinct symbolism and performance of identity at play during sardana dances. Dancing sardana is an assertion of national symbolism and identity:
“Since it is considered a national dance, every sardana performance can become an act of assertion of ethnicity” (Ibid.:42).
I will now go on to analyze more thoroughly the values implied in the sardana.
Values of Sardana
Stanly Brandes terms the dance a “symbolic act of ethno-cultural affirmation” (Brandes 1990:24). I argue that the semi-official status of the sardana and the institutionalized teaching of the dance (Brandes 1990:26), can be seen as an active invention of tradition - a constructed symbol of the nation of Catalonia (Ibid.:29). An invention of tradition is taken to mean a set of practices or customs seeking to promote certain values through repetition, implying continuity with the past or, well, tradition (Hobsbawm 2010:1). Brandes writes that the sardana has indeed been identified with what is regarded as Catalan values; fraternity, harmony and democracy (Ibid.:30). Martí i Perez even uses the terms sardanisme and Sardanista to describe the sardana as a socio-cultural complex:

[D]ancers who do not limit themselves to enjoying the dance but also believe strongly in what the dance means - music in the service of an idea (Martí i Perez 1994:44).

The Sardana implies certain values as a national dance, of community, brotherhood and as a traditional, moral and “pure” dance (Martí i Perez 1994). Consider this quote about the merits of sardana:

“En las danzas modernas, existen el contacto, la proximidad de los personas de distinto sexo avivando las pasiones carnales (…), en la sardana solamente se unen por las manos formando hermosacadenade amor nacional. Considerando también que cuando se desarrolla una costumbre honesta decrecen las inmorales, no podemos menos de reconocer su benéfica influencia en la sociedad” (Martí i Pérez 1994:44, quoting Monsalvatje and Aleu 1895).
Sardana was seen as representing conservative values such as the love of the homeland (Catalonia), platonic relationships and idealized rural environments as in the Catalan countryside (Ibid.). At the same time, the dance was seen as purely Catalan without foreign influence, extending as a tradition much further back in time than was actually the case of its late 18th century origin.
Brandes argues that the dance became a national symbol because it became identified with so-called “core” Catalan values, including “harmonia ("harmony"), germanor (“brotherhood” and democracia (“democracy”)” (Brandes 1990:30). Because sardana is a circle dance with no lead dancers, it implies unity and equality. Interestingly, writing over 20 years ago, Brandes asserts that dancers often cry “Visca![1]”, on the final step of the dance. One informant told him what this implied: Visca el poble nostre, Catalunya, las sardana, el germanor; totplegat![2]" (Ibid.:32). There seems to be very strong ties between the sardana and national symbolism and identity.

Brandes stresses the uniformity of the dance steps and the unbroken circle as examples of unity-generating symbols. He quotes the saying: "Tan ací com a Girona, l'anella ha d'ésser rodona" [Here as in Girona, the dance ring should be round] (Ibid.:33)
This implies not only that the circle should be unbroken, firm and united – but also that it should be so all over Catalonia.

Based on these examples, I argue that the values of sardana assume cultural homogeneity: A shared ethnic identity, the unity of the nation of Catalonia and the conserving of traditional, Catalan values.

Geertz and Failed Rituals
Geertz wrote Ritual and Social Change to show that rituals are not always integrative and do not always bring about unity and cohesion. Sometimes, they simply do not work. As his empirical example, Geertz uses the situation of a failed funeral rite in Bali, the so-called slametan. A young socialist has died, and social tension erupts when there is doubt about whether he should have a traditional Muslim funeral or not. The funeral rite fails to restore peace and instead bringing about tension as “a microcosmic example of the broader conflicts, structural dissolutions, and attempted reintegrations which, in one form or another, are characteristic of contemporary Indonesian society” (Geertz 1957:35) The clash stands between new changes in the social organization of the village, with ideological political parties forming rifts and links where there once were none, and traditional cultural traditions.
A 1907 photograph of a traditional Slametan.
Wikipedia Commons
Geertz’ primary point is that we must analytically distinguish between cultural and social processes: They are independent variables but interdependent factors (Ibid.:33). Geertz sees culture as the way in which we interpret our experiences and guide our actions; social structure is the form this action takes in reality, the net of lived social relations. A ritual is not only a pattern of meaning but also a social interaction. Therefore, social tension or conflict can easily be part of rituals. The social dynamics at play in society are also at play during rituals (Geertz 1957:52). Furthermore, changes in social organizations can affect the process of the ritual and the significance it carries. ). That is, the social organization and the cultural ideology (or custom), can be conflicting: Highly differentiated occupational structure and a multiclass society in opposition to traditional cultural symbols and ethic. This causes the rituals that are part of the “old” cultural system to fail in their effects, because they are not aligned with the present social organization. 

Discussion
I argue that this is also true of the sardana. I base this on the implicit values inherent in the sardana and the nation-building process that caused its rapid spread as part of a nationalistic project of inventing traditions. The sardana was “made” and exported with the purpose of strengthening existing Catalan ethnic and national unity or outright creating these identities where they didn’t exist. In this way, the sardana is like the Indonesian funeral rite slametan, part of a cultural pattern that does not fit new social differentiations in present day Catalan society:
The slametan remains unchanged, blind to the major lines of social and cultural demarcation in urban life. For it, the primary classifying characteristic of an individual is where he lives” (Geertz 1957:52).
The sardana implies unity and homogeneity for Catalans. But this homogeneity no longer exists and therefore the feelings of national unity are often lacking in sardana performances. During the two performances of Sardana that I witnessed, the mayority of spectators where in reality tourists and not Catalans. On both occasions, they were in the way of the dancers, crowding instead to look at the cobla, which they thought were the center of attention. They did not know what was happening, how they were supposed to react or what the sardana meant. The spectators in this way actually harmed the performance, preventing the dancers from forming new circles with fluidity and obscuring them.
On both occasions, there were likewise Catalans attempting to enforce a national sentiment to the performance. One man placed himself in several strategic spots where he could easily be seen and cried “Visca Catalunya[3]!” several times on the last step of a dance, obviously expecting replies. There were no response from dancers or spectators, no explicit manifestations of Catalan unity or nationality. The spontaneous outcries and grand feelings Brandes described 20 years ago, was certainly not applicable to my experience.
On another occasion, a man paced around the square with a small Catalan flag, seeking acknowledgement from both dancers and spectators, of which he received none. He was not able to instill any response or reaction.
Furthermore, all dancers were of highly advanced age, none were young or below retirement age. That sardana has a severe “age-crisis” despite being highly institutionalized is a point raised by several other texts on sardana:
Many performances suffer now from a worrisome lack of dancers, so that the main concern of the sardanamilieu is the winning back of the younger generations” (Martí i Perez 1994:44).
I argue that the values of sardana no longer bind Catalans together as before, because of a change in social structure. As Geertz put it, we might point to an “incongruity between the cultural framework of meaning and the patterning of social interaction” (Geertz 1957:52).
We might also call this differences between cultural representations and social organization. In modern Catalonia, the issues and ties important to the people living there are not only national. There has been a shift in feelings of belonging, communities being based on many other things than the simple national and geographical bonds of an idealized Catalan homeland. This is due to a process of modernization, argues Geertz:
Population growth, urbanization, monetization, occupational differentiation, and the like, have combined to weaken the traditional ties of peasant social structure; (…) structural changes have disturbed the simple uniformity of religious belief and practice characteristic of an earlier period” (Geertz 1957:37).
In modernity there has been a change of integrative ties; from bonds of geography and kinship to ideological communities, labor relations, student organizations etc. Furthermore, as for those for whom Catalan nationalism and independence are still very important issues, there are other, more potent channels of expression than folkloric rituals (Martí i Perez 1994:44).

Conclusion
Social class, political ideology, occupation, regional origin, religious preference, age, sex or place of residence are now important factors of modern Catalan identity. Because of this, the sardana is no longer integrating in the same way as before; Catalan people have many social ties and no longer only the geographical bond of being from Catalonia. The ritual, in this case the sardana, cannot function as before because it cannot unite all Catalans in the same values. Geertz’ point about the Indonesian funeral rite slametan is valid here as well: “The bonds they are strengthening (…) are no longer the bonds which most emphatically hold them together(Geertz 1957:52).
The sardana was envisioned as a nationalistic project, and this symbolic value given to the sardana was mainly responsible for its early boom and widespread dissemination (Martí i Perez 1994:44). But being part of this national symbolism similarly prevents the sardana from developing in terms of its organization or social meaning. The success and the “failure” of sardana are thus linked. The dance of course still works as an interesting dance and as a symbol of Catalan culture. But it no longer accommodates to current social realities and has lost much of its unifying power. The “crisis” of the sardana stems from a discontinuity between social structure and culture; the sardana represents a Catalan national unity that does not exists as such a salient issue in complex, class-segregated societies.
The social structure has changed and the ritual must as well – or fail.

Bibliography
Brandes, Stanley
1990: “The Sardana: Catalan Dance and Catalan National Identity.” The Journal of American Folklore 103(407):24-41. Retrieved November 22, 2010
Geertz, Clifford
1957: “Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example.” American Anthropologist, New Series Vol. 59(1):pp. 32-54.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. (ed.)
2010 [1983]: The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge University Press
Laura Desfor Edles
1999: “A Culturalist Approach to Ethnic Nationalist Movements: Symbolization and Basque and Catalan Nationalism in Spain.” Social Science History 23(3):311-355. Retrieved November 22, 2010.
Martí i Pérez, J.
1994: “The Sardana as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon in Contemporary Catalonia.” Yearbook for Traditional Music 39–46.
Sjørslev, Inger
2010: “The Material Subject: Style and Pointing in Public Performance.”




[1]Live long”!
[2]Long live our people, Catalonia, the sardana, brotherhood; all together!”
[3] Long live Catalonia!
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