Guide to the 2014 Catalan Independence Referendum

A mural in Granollers (Vallès Oriental) in Catalonia supporting the independence referendum and the yes vote. From murals9n.blogspot.com.es

This was an article written for One-Europe and posted in the week preceding the Catalan Independence Referendum on the 9th of November. It is meant as a brief description of the history, current situation, key players, and prospects for Catalonia, Spain, and Europe.

On the 9th of November 2014 the 7.2 million inhabitants of Catalonia, currently one of the 17 Autonomous Regions of Spain, will vote on independence from Spain in a move labeled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court and denounced as illegal by the Spanish government. The referendum, referred to colloquially as 9N, has gone through many changes and negotiations over the past few months – some of which are even on-going in the last week before the polls open.

The principal players in these negotiations are:

• Catalan Regional President Artur Mas from the center-right and moderately nationalist party CiU 
• Oriol Junqueras, leader of the left-wing and strongly nationalist ERC which forms the parliamentary support for Mas’ independence coalition  
• Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy from the right-wing PP 
• The Spanish Constitutional Court 

As well as a host of Catalan grass-roots movements, organizations and NGOs campaigning in favor of independence.
In the periphery of the debate stand the many stateless nations, minority nationalist and separatist movements in the EU, principally represented by the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Other states facing minority movements such as the UK (Scotland and Wales), France (Brittany, Corsica, Savoy, and others), Italy (Veneto, Sardinia, and others) and several other countries are also following the Catalan referendum debate closely.

A yes vote could have enormous consequences not only for Catalonia, but for Spain and the EU as well. Catalonia represents around 20% of the Spanish economic output and their secession would have disastrous results for an already crisis-ridden Spain, perhaps even leading to a statewide bankruptcy.

The immediate lead-up to the referendum ostensibly started as early as 2010, when the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the newly formulated Catalan Statute unconstitutional. The Statute, approved by both a popular Catalan vote and by a large majority in the Catalan parliament, was essentially a bill of rights that would have increased Catalan autonomy and given it the definition of a nation, one of the Constitutional Court’s foremost points of critique. In 2012, large-scale pro-independence rallies gathered upwards of 2 million Catalans in the regional capital of Barcelona, an act repeated by 1.5 million demonstrators on the Catalan National Day of September 11th 2014. This led to elections, where Artur Mas (CiU) emerged as the victor with an electoral campaign emphasizing independence for Catalonia. In December 2013, a broad coalition of pro-independence parties (El Pacte Nacional pel Dret a Decidir) in the Catalan parliament agreed upon both the date of November 9th 2014 and the questions to be posed to the Catalan voters:

1) “Do you want Catalonia to become a state?” (“Vol que Catalunya esdevingui un estat?)   2) “In case of an affirmative response [to the above], do you want this state to be independent?” (En cas afirmatiu, vol que aquest estat sigui independent?”)   

This September, as supporters of Catalan independence flooded the streets of Barcelona, Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy asserted the illegality of the referendum, and brought it to the Constitutional Court. After a preliminary veto from the Court and the strong statements against it by the Spanish government, it seemed at first that President Mas would cancel the referendum. Following massive internal protest in Mas’ independence coalition from ERC , the Catalan Greens and the pro-independence, Marxist party CUP, Mas clarified that the referendum will indeed take place, but labeled it an ‘alternative consultation’. This put into question the political weight and legitimacy of the referendum, but still allows for the possibility that a ‘yes’ might lead to the Catalan parliament declaring independence.

So where do the Catalans stand now, one week before the scheduled referendum?

Over 35.000 volunteers have signed up to aid in the referendum, and more than 900 municipal governments in Catalonia have offered their public support, with only six refusing to cooperate. The regional government will supply materials, urns, and all of the 6.430 ballot boxes will be located in governmental buildings or public schools. Several poll-sites have been opened for Catalans living abroad in London, Berlin, Copenhagen and other places, and the eligibility to vote has not been changed. The most recent polls show that more than 80% of Catalans support the vote, with around 56% supporting outright independence

Technically then, the new ‘alternative’ referendum is almost identical to what was initially proposed. The political value of a yes has been heavily diluted, however, to the chagrin of ERC chairman Oriol Junqueras. His party has openly criticized Mas’ leadership and attempts at political compromise with the Madrid government, culminating in Junqueras’ recent statement that “independence is not negotiated; it is proclaimed (…) The pact is over. ” In recent polls, ERC seems to have greatly increased their support, and would likely topple Mas’ government, should elections follow the referendum.

Parallel to these internal Catalan tensions are the continuing claims from Madrid that the referendum is illegal and unconstitutional. The Spanish government has not yet specified the consequences for Catalonia if the referendum is held, but Prime Rajoy has menacingly assured that “the government has all necessary measures ready in case anyone tries to hold an illegal referendum. ” The options of charging President Mas with high treason and the suspension of the regional autonomy of Catalonia have been suggested, both of which would be unprecedented and extremely serious measures. Furthermore, thousands of Spanish Civil Guard police officers have been readied in case the government decides to send them into Catalonia to prevent the referendum. It is unknown how Catalonia’s own police force, the Mossos d’Esquadra, would react to such an intervention but ERC’s Junqueras has called for nation-wide civil disobedience if the referendum is prevented from taking place.

With only hours left until the ballot-boxes open it is still uncertain how the Catalan independence referendum will proceed, as are the political consequences of a yes vote. More certain are the deep rifts that have formed between the Spanish and Catalan governments, and the high stakes facing the citizens of Catalonia seeking a democratic vote this Sunday.

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How not to deal with separatist movements: The Catalan Example.

Stateless nations in Europe according to eurominority.eu. Catalonia is in the northeast of Spain.

An article I recently wrote for the online media platform One-Europe. Reprinted here on my personal blog.

Following the recent unexpected shift in momentum for the independence movements in Europe, particularly those of Scotland and Catalonia, EU policy makers in several states have too had to ask themselves one important question:  How do we reach a mutually beneficial, satisfactory, and above all peaceful solution to the issue of 'separatist' movements? 

For a prime example of how policy makers should not act in the sensitive matter of separatism we can look south to the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. The confrontational stance exhibited by Rajoy and the Spanish government towards the Catalonian region has helped to radicalize the Spanish political spectrum, thus creating serious democratic problems and heightened antagonism between the political actors at the regional level (Catalan) and the national level. The continued unequivocal refusal by Rajoy to allow a referendum on independence for Catalonia despite the wishes of several million Catalonian inhabitants presents him with a democratic problem, one which he has not handled well. His rigid legalism and lack of willingness to negotiate with separatists has effectively shut down dialogue between the government in Madrid and their regional counterpart in Barcelona, making Catalan frustrations rise further. 

Although dominant at a regional level, the lack of separatist representation in national parliaments around Europe hinders their recognition as legitimate political movements and democratically representative actors. In the UK parliament for example, the regionally dominating Scottish National Party (SNP) currently holds no seats in the House of Lords and only 6 out of 650 seats in the House of Commons. In Spain, the second largest and most ardently separatist party, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), holds 3 out of 350 seats, with the less radical CiU holding 16 in both the Senate and the Congress of Deputies. However, the vitality and democratic legitimacy of these parties can hardly be questioned. They dominate regional elections and in the case of Catalonia they manage to arrange pro-independence rallies of almost a third of their regions’ populations. Despite their lack of institutional power at a national level, they are a democratic force to be reckoned with – and should be recognized as a valuable partner in dialogue. 

When I spoke to ERC politicians in 2011, before the mass demonstrations in Barcelona, they correctly foresaw the renewed rise of the Catalan independence movement stating that issues of independence tended to fall in the background when the government did not apply pressure on Catalonia. Whenever the central Spanish government acts in a confrontational manner, support for separatism surges. If they did nothing at all, activist Carles de Rosselló argued, “We’d only be four separatists in Catalonia in 20 years time”. 

After the onset of the economic crisis the possibility for tensions between relatively well-off Catalonia and the rest of Spain has increased. Instead of calling for dialogue and understanding the PP government launched a political offensive against the integrated school system of Catalonia where teaching in Catalan is compulsory in public primary schools (though not private schools). Now the Catalan government must offer public education in Spanish to any student demanding it. This has effectively divided the education system into Spanish-language and Catalan-language schools and further causing tensions in a region that is already ripe with conflicting ethnic and linguistic identifications. “[They’re] (sic) creating ghettos”, Pau Vinyes from the ERC told me. “One school here chooses Catalan, another one Castilian. It’s going to be completely ghettoized”. A recent article in the Catalan newspaper La Vanguardia revealed that only four families out of a population of more than 7 million had demanded public schooling in Spanish, making this issue a highly symbolic venture for the Madrid Government rather than an expression of actual need on behalf of Catalonia’s citizens. 

The Catalans have taken to the streets to show their frustration time and time again, most recently during the National Holiday “la Diada” on the 11th of September this year. In 2012, a pro-independence rally in the regional capital of Barcelona numbered upwards of two million people according to the BBC, such acts cement the mass appeal of separatism in Catalonia. Compared to Catalonia the Scots seem almost apathetic. By allowing a referendum on independence to be carried out the 18th of September, David Cameron’s government has kept the debate civil and effectively lowered the tempers of the Scots, preventing the type of protests seen in Catalonia. 

After the Spanish transition to democracy following Dictator Franco’s death in 1976 many Catalan political actors expected a move towards a federal state – a move that for many reasons failed to happen causing many Catalans to feel robbed of autonomy. The ERC activists I spoke with had all favored federalist solutions in the past but now feel continually betrayed by the central government’s lack of dialogue and unwillingness to comprise in Catalan issues. As Alfred Bosch, MP for ERC has stated: “The federalist cause is very difficult for the federalists, because no-one wants to federalize with them anymore”. 

This is perhaps most exemplified by the Madrid government’s outright refusal to accept the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2006, a document both written by democratically elected representatives and approved by a popular Catalan vote. 

By denying dialogue, and referendums the Spanish government are neglecting the frustrations felt by millions of Catalans and Rajoy is contributing to tensions and animosity in both Catalonia and Spain as a whole. Rather than uniting the population that voted him into office, Rajoy has shown himself to aggravate tensions between the Catalan regional government and the separatist Catalans on one side, and his own government and the people of Spain on the other. 

Since federalist alternatives are no longer an option, and as the Spanish government staunchly refuses all dialogue and negotiation with the Catalan government, many Catalans see only one option: Take to the streets and (re) claim their autonomy and independence. 

Such an outcome is more radical, less democratic and more prone to creating ethnic fault lines and tensions in both Spain and Catalonia than if the Spanish government had swallowed their pride, sat down to negotiate and recognized the mass popular wish for autonomy in the region of Catalonia. 

EU policy-makers faced with separatist issues should take note.

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